While it is true that Latin American republics had no rival on maximising revenues from custom collection during the belle époque, this paper shows that Latin American countries were also generous importers, only behind the larger commercial countries of Western Europe in terms of imports per capita. Latin American citizens were much more linked to international trade than citizens of most regions of the world. Their relation to the world economy was tighter both via their imports and their exports relative to their population and income levels. This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when descending from the regional to the national level.
'Protectionist but globalised?
Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-1914 belle époque'
Recent evidence seems to demonstrate that Latin America was the most protectionist region in the world from at least 1865 up to World War I.
1 This is a surprising fact, given that Latin
America is believed to have exploited globalisation forces better than most regions before the 1920s. Even when it is recognised that high tariffs mostly responded to the revenue needs of the Latin American governments, the implicit assumption is that 'high tariffs still must have had a powerful protective effect'. 2 This adds to the perplexity for most of us 'who have always been taught to view the Great Depression as the critical turning point when the region is said to have turned towards protection and de-linked from the world economy for the first time '. 3 This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when descending from the regional to the national level.
The data provided by the United Kingdom Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other
Foreign Countries, allows investigating this matter in detail from 1890 to 1912. Since the Latin American republics made for a large share of the independent countries of the world in the pre-1914 years, data of trade is available for 23 Latin American countries with custom more than 15 percent of cacao world exports, and Cuban sugar production represented 25 percent of world sugar cane output and much higher proportion of sugar-cane exports. in English currency. 9 The later is used throughout the paper.
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Figure 1 plots the total exports of the region by country and provides some first insights into the period. 11 Firstly, the trend for the overall region is clearly upwards, as expected, but not dramatic. In the second place it is already visible the great diversity of the continent, too Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. recognises, in order to make them comparable 'this requires knowledge of the relevant exchange rates which -for the 19 th century-was not always simple to acquire ' (p.412) . But in fact Mitchell says 'certain gaps have been filled from the British Statistical Abstract for Foreign Countries (1872 Countries ( -1912 ' (p. xv) . So using the Abstract shall be equivalent to using Mitchell, with the plus of avoiding the hazards of the exchange rates making comparisons far easier. 11 Special imports and exports (for home consumption) are normally listed and are the ones used in this paper. When only general imports and exports were reported, these were used. The value of imports and exports referred to merchandise only, excluding trade of gold and silver bullion for which a different table was provided in the Abstract. total amounts exported by the immediate followers, namely Chile, Mexico and Cuba. Of these three, the fastest growth corresponded to Mexico, which according to these series, started the period far behind Chile but achieved its very same levels by the eve of the Mexican Revolution. Uruguay appears as a fairly stable exporter, not growing much but keeping its position as the fifth larger exporter of the region. Venezuela is the only country of the large exporters that seems to lose ground. With the available data (only 1890-1894 then interpolated to the next data offered in 1904), Venezuela went from being among the large exporters in 1890 to be left behind by Peru, the impressive export growth of Puerto Rico, Bolivia and Colombia. All of which exhibited clear growth trends in their total exports prior to World War I.
[FIGURE1: TOTAL EXPORTS IN LATIN AMERICA Even the smaller countries participated increasingly in the world markets over the period. Central America concentrates few of the most diverse histories. Ranging between 1 and 2 pounds per capita of exports all through, the countries that started from the lower levels of the sub-region, Ecuador and El Salvador, steadily grew. In the mean time, the initially larger exporters per capita of Central America, Guatemala and Nicaragua remained pretty flat, while Honduras levels kept falling.
Finally, the Colombian case is highly interesting as it reflects the loss of its wealthiest province -Panama, independent from 1903. While the former province's exports per capita spurred upwards, Colombia was left with the lowest level of exports per capita of the region.
Thus Colombians were the Latin American citizens obtaining the less absolute profit from participating in the international markets.
[ Even Latin American citizens obtaining the less profit from participating in the international markets, the Colombians, were getting more than the Asian citizens, by far the less exposed to global markets.
In general, Figure 3 [FIGURE 4: EXPORTS vs. INCOME PER CAPITA, WORLD REGIONS 1890 -1912 This first insight only tells us that Latin Americans were able to sell in the world markets at least as much as everyone else, and in some cases much more, relative to their population sizes and incomes. It does not tell us whether they were net winners in their relation with the international markets. Yet, trade balances also favoured Latin America through out this period regardless the amount of exports per capita as shown in Figure 5 . In fact, except for America, the United States and the Russian Empire had no rival exhibiting trade surpluses the question is whether this was the result of effective protection on the import side. This is explored in the issuing sections. After exploring the custom collection, the levels of imports will be analysed.
Latin American custom duties during the pre-1914 'belle époque'
Data on total custom duties collected is much more scant in the Abstract than data in total trade. [ One should remind that in 'countries with little experience with tax collection, few bureaucratic resources to implement it efficiently, and limited access to foreign capital markets, customs revenues are an easy-to-collect source of fiscal income essential to support central government expenditures on defense and civil administration'. 21 That was certainly the case of Latin America. Table 2 shows the crucial importance that custom revenues had as fiscal source of income. For the six Latin American countries which data are available custom duties represented between half and three quarters of total government revenues, reaching almost 90 percent in the case of Chile by 1910. 22 It is expected that other countries in the region would have levels of reliance on custom duties of no less than 50 per cent on average.
The relevance of custom revenues for Latin American governments shall serve as background for the analysis of the levels of average tariff rate -custom revenues as a share of total import values-as well as duty collection per capita in Latin America.
20 While according to the Abstract all efforts were made in order to assure the custom collection reflected those duties imposed on imports only, it also recognised that it was not always possible to distinguish from other custom collection (namely exports). Thus for now, we will refer to the figures as 'custom collection' assuming for the most part refer to those levied on imports, but no giving it for granted. 21 Thus here as with exports, Colombia was getting less than any other Latin American country from its relations with the world markets. It had the lower exports per capita of the region and its government obtained less per capita than any other in the region from custom collection. At the other end, the countries whose citizens were already well linked to world markets through exports -Uruguay, Argentine and Cuba-were also the ones whose governments were capturing more revenues from international trade measured per habitant.
[FIG.8: COLLECTION (% OVER IMPORTS), WORLD REGIONS, 1890 -1912 How do Latin American custom collections contrast with the rest of the world? The answer is plotted in Figures 8 and 9 . In Figure 8 it is easy to check that no other group of countries match the high average tariff rates of Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. Nevertheless, individual countries may have punctual levels close to these countries. For instance by the change of the century the levels of the Russian Empire were close to the 40 per cent levels, but never above. Even the Latin American countries with the lower average tariff rates come up as highly 'protectionist' in contrast with Asia, Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and overall Western Europe. Yet, the latter two groups had the lower average tariff rates of the whole world.
After all, Latin America diversity forces us to look more closely at the country level. High average tariff rates are of course found in the United Status, but also in Portugal, Greece, the Phillipines and the Russian Empire. These match, and in occasions surpass, the levels of 
But they buy (despite duties!): Latin America imports over the 'belle époque'
Could this bulky custom collection be the explanation behind the export surpluses observed in the previous section? The cross-country comparisons shown in Figure 10 If we look at the medium size importers, they imported at levels equivalent to those of Southern and Eastern Europe. Even the small importers among the Latin American nations, including Colombia, imported more than the Russian Empire (who were indeed applying high average tariff rates too) and the Asian nations of the sample. Observe that Latin
American countries were in general importing more per capita than nations with much lower average tariff rates, but also imported more than nations with equally high average tariff rates such as the Russian Empire, Portugal, the Philippines or Greece. Given this evidence, it is not possible to say that Latin America was de-linked from the international economy, despite the high custom collection. Latin American citizens were buying from the world markets in reasonably large amounts.
[ DATES 1890 DATES , 1901 DATES , 1910 A closer look at the figures can be obtained from Table 3 for years 1890, 1901 and 1910 .
Ranked according to their imports per capita in those years, it is clear that Uruguay, the Argentine and Cuba were top world importers right behind the most open economies of the time, despite facing average tariff rates ten times higher than the European countries immediately above and below their levels. Table 3 also insists in the wide differences across Latin America, which in terms of per capita imports, were at least as wide as the observed among the European of the core and the periphery, and possibly wider. It is true, however that if we draw a line at the level of the US imports per capita, knowing that they were a closed economy, then a large number of Latin American countries will appear as closed economies given their low level of imports per capita. Yet the income per capita of the US was the highest of the world at this time, thus the comparison of import per capita without looking at income levels is futile. Income per capita is plotted against import per capita in Figure 13 .
[FIGURE 13: IMPORTS VS INCOME PER CAPITA, WORLD REGIONS, 1890 -1912 Relative to their income, Latin Americans were still importing in large amounts. Take for instance Brazil, a medium importer per capita within Latin America. Relative to its income per capita, Brazil was importing per capita much more than countries having equivalent income. Or in other words, Brazil imports per capita were at the level of countries that had a much higher income per capita. Thus relative to its income the Brazilian were spending more in the international markets than many other nations. The same can be said, of the other Latin
American nations for which income data are available: they imported at the levels appropriate for the income levels they had, and some times imported above the expected level. If high tariffs had a powerful protective effect one should observe lower imports per capita not only relative to other countries, but also relative to the income level of the countries. This is no much evidence of reduced imports in Latin America in either case. For some reason, despite the high custom collection Latin American countries continue to import.
[ This paradox calls for further investigation, possibly beyond the scope of this one paper.
Nevertheless some tentative explanations can be outlined for these results to hold: the possibility of a differential price-elasticity of demand for imports in Latin America, the inadequacy of using average tariff rates as indicator of protection and finally the possible problems associated with the data reported as customs collections.
First, price-elasticity of demand determines how protective a tariff actually is. If the demand for imports is very elastic, thus it reacts quickly and in large amounts to a change in prices, a small increase in the tariff would reduce the amounts imported meaningfully. On the contrary, if the products imported were relatively price-inelastic, thus people continue to demand them regardless of a price increase then, an increase in the import tariff will not reduce imports. Therefore, the proportion of low elasticity of demand products -and the intensity of such inelasticity-in the imports basket of any given country will be crucial for the determining the impact of the import tariff . Therefore, one could very well face the paradox presented above assuming that the Latin American imports were more price-inelastic than the demand for imports in other countries so that Latin American citizens continued to import much needed or wanted goods despite the high tariffs. 24 If so was the case, then average import tariff cannot be considered protective for inelasticity works both ways. As much as the quantity imported did not diminish at higher prices (due to tariffs), smaller tariffs would not produce higher demand for these goods. Furthermore, the changing nature of the import basket across time and countries will result in very different impacts of tariffs on the amounts imported across time and place. Evidence regarding price elasticity of the demand for imports in Latin America is lacking and research on this area should quickly be up in the agenda of economic historians.
24 Income distribution may also play an important role in this regard given that the income elasticity of the demand for imports will determine the type of products to be imported.
Even if one could question the differential price-inelasticity of Latin American imports, the average tariff rate has itself been questioned as a good measure of protection. From the average tariff rate one can not say whether what is being taxed are luxurious goods paying incredibly high amounts to enter the country, while most things enter paying relatively little or non duty or whether a uniform tariff is applied throughout to all imports. These two tariff rules would have very different impact on the actual imports but may turn out to show very similar average tariff rates depending of the amounts imported, the size of the tax, and the price elasticity of the products imported. Thus the pledge for separate cross country industrial, primary and fiscal product tariff average made by some scholars within the European context would also be advisable before further assessment of the Latin American tariff.
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Last but not least, the possible problems associated with the data reported as customs collections must also be considered. From a European perspective custom collection is directly identified to duties levied on imports. Elsewhere in the world such assumption is no so clear. Even when the heading of the corresponding table in the Abstract says 'Total Amount of import duties collected in each of the respective countries' the footnotes to the earlier years explain that it was not always possible to distinguish import from other custom collection (namely exports). Thus far in the paper we have always referred to the figures as 'custom collection' assuming for the most part refer to those levied on imports, but it cannot be given for granted. Several hints indicate that one should be cautious before the possibility that custom duties in Latin America included not only import but also export duties charged on minerals and cash-crops exported. For instance, given that custom collection was so crucial for Latin American countries, taxing exports was the obvious second best to taxing exports. They indeed taxed exports by 1929 Chilean custom duties were half imports half export duties according to Bulmer-Thomas data. Section one above explains that moderate export taxes were among the policies implemented among the Latin American countries. It also reports that Latin American nations commanded many commodity markets, and thus could well be rolling on to the world markets the price increases due to export taxes. also hint at the common the inclusion of export duties along with import duties. Even if export duties were not included for all countries in Latin America (and elsewhere outside Europe) and even when their importance may be small (2 to 10 per cent of all custom collected), it would suffice to drop the average tariff rates to more standard levels.
Conclusion
Whatever the explanation for the paradox might turn out to be, this paper comes to show that 
